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Abstract: 
Econometrics is seen as the dominant method in terms of applicability, accuracy and 
efficiency in economic science. It is widely used and other methods have been reduced to 
marginal contributions. Econometricians behave as if their techniques were universal 
when in fact they are not. If alternative methods are accepted, one can largely eliminate 
the restrictions and distance to reality of econometrics. The article debates the pathways 
for a satisfactory economics in a context where theoretical and methodological pluralism 
is entering even in mainstream ideas. The historical construction of econometrics as the 
main method in economics and the limitations and possibilities of this tool are explored, 
underlining the need of pluralism.  
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HIGHLIGHTS 
>This article debates the role of econometrics in economic science. > The establishment 
of econometrics as a dominant technique in economics is explained. > Central 
assumptions of the method are discussed. > Opinions of several authors regarding 
methodological formalism are debated. > Conclusions underline the need of pluralism 
to analyze economy today.  
*Research Highlights
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The Role of Econometrics in Economic Science: An Essay about the 
Monopolization of Economic Methodology by Econometric Methods 
 
1. Introduction: Is It Important to Discuss Econometrics? 
Economists and economics have been widely criticized for an excessive use of 
mathematical formalization, beginning in the differential calculus, through operational 
research and arriving at econometrics (Hodgson, 2007; Dow, 2005; Chick 1998). 
Currently, it is clear that in the orthodox point of view, there is no other economics 
than the one that develops economic explanation models with a robust quantitative 
approach. Economics as a science should try to rethink their ability to accept different 
theories and methodologies without considering that abdicates from its scientific 
objectivity. Added to this theoretical debate comes the moment of today when 
economics is being accused of supporting and legitimizing liberal policies that led to 
the successive crises, in particular due to the dominance of orthodoxy in the 
mainstream of the discipline that celebrates the power of market as the main 
economic institution. 
This is an old discussion to redefine economics but that assumes today a renewed 
importance because of the financial crisis that has been subject of attention in 
reference journals. Today it is increasingly clear that econometrics, the most 
sublimated tool by the orthodoxy of the economic discipline, alone, without a robust 
interpretation, is a weak instrument, especially if used unreasonably, for example, 
with little solid data, with variables that not express the phenomena we want to 
achieve, with poorly specified models, with exaggerated inference to the ability of the 
model. Discuss the role of econometrics has without a doubt its value, regardless its 
usefulness or robustness. It is mainly because econometrics is useful in many cases 
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that this article attempts to understand its limits, so economists, social scientists, 
policy-makers and other users can be alert and able to reduce its flaws.  
The following text tries to be a defence of econometrics. Based on its historical 
construction it is tried to understand how econometrics was established as the 
dominant technique in economics. Then, central assumptions of econometrics are 
discussed evidencing strengths and weaknesses. In the end, it is underlined the 
importance of methodological pluralism to analyze the complexity of economic 
diversity. The essay concludes that several methodological approaches are consistent 
with the increasing acceptance of heterodox assumptions in theory. These diverse 
approaches are arriving to the mainstream of the discipline and beginning to structure 
a more satisfactory economics, able to explain, in a relevant and accurate way, the 
complexity of what is the economic. 
 
2. Econometrics: Some Historical Crucial Moments 
 
Unlike the classical economists, such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo or Karl Marx 
who saw economics as a historicized science of social relations of production and 
distribution of value, the neoclassical revolution tried to think the social order as a 
mechanic phenomenon. These new economists, like Jevons, Edgeworth, Menger, 
Walras, Pareto, among others, have tried to empty the discipline from its social 
content with a rigorization through quantification and mathematization. 
It is worth mentioning, as highlighted by Nelson and Nelson (2002) that economics, 
before the neoclassical theory was assumed as orthodoxy, was eminently evolutionist 
and institutionalist. Smith and Marx discussed topics that largely exceeded the limited 
scope of what could be explained by theories dominated by the rationality of homo 
economicus. 
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As stressed by Louçã (2003) the origin of value, an open problem in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, was overcome with the marginalist revolution and the idea 
of a subjective utility where each agent is rational and tries to maximize it. These 
thinkers took the first law of thermodynamics as a unifying mathematical pattern: the 
lagrangean maximization could be applied to a set of atoms, the agents, the 
methodological individualism in its extreme, giving relevance to the concept of 
equilibrium, the point where all dynamics collapses. To this notion, these economists 
added a normative component, the idea that this equilibrium was the social optimum, 
the situation where atomized agents moved by their selfishness maximized their 
utility and thus the collective well-being which consisted of individual preferences 
aggregation. 
When physics developed the second law of thermodynamics, which resulted in the 
notion of entropy, rather than the equilibrium as the main force of the universe and the 
introduction of the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg, economists maintained their 
convictions, following no change in the sciences that initially inspired them.  
It is worth mentioning that at this historical moment, the neoclassical school of 
thought could not beat their theoretical opponents: the German historical school, the 
American institutionalism and the Cambridge tradition of Alfred Marshall maintained 
a strong membership and robustness. Before World War I and in the interwar period, 
pluralism was the dominant force in economics (Morgan and Rutherford, 1998), 
where different and internally highly plural theories coexisted. These authors 
underlined that the economists of the early twentieth century shared a type of 
scientific economic science more concrete than abstract, with a moral commitment to 
ensure standards of scientific inquiry, objectivity combined with advocacy. Louçã 
(2003) underlined that the change came only with a second generation of economists. 
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Their motives were to combat the effects of the 1929 recession through proactive 
policies. They came from areas such as mathematics or physics and intended to act on 
the social reality. The program based on econometrics, a non neoclassical approach, 
supported regulation and state intervention in private activities, abandoning the 
concept of invisible hand. The main idea focused on rebuilding economics for the 
rigorous and quantified knowledge. John Maynard Keynes was a crucial figure in this 
process. The efforts of many organizations at this time to build relevant macro 
databases, such as the National Bureau of Economic Research, were central to 
stimulate these practices.  Other examples of these thinkers are central economists in 
the history of the XX century: Tinbergen, Marshak, Lange, Koopmans, Neyman, 
Meade and specially Ragnar Frisch, the founder of the Econometric Society whose 
motto was "science is measurement". These names are particularly prominent if we 
connect them to the Nobel distinction (Neves, 1998). Economics was seen as a policy 
tool against unemployment, generating descriptive and normative knowledge. 
Previous theoretical tools of neoclassical school were outdated and had not allowed to 
prevent and remedy the problems of the crisis (Louçã, 2003: 597). Institutionalist 
economists started coming under attack in the late 1930s, partly because they were 
unable to provide a set of policy recommendations that were considered to be 
successful against the Great Depression. For Morgan and Rutherford, the World War 
II stimulated a move in economics towards the formalism of neoclassical economics. 
At this time, economists were demanded to build up tools for solving policy 
problems. Economics emerged as specific tool-kit knowledge instead of an area of 
study for a specific socio-economic domain. The establishment of a more formal 
economics required changes in language, form, and tools where econometrics fitted 
like a missing piece of a puzzle. This new style became a set of standards that was 
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reducing in itself the possibility of pluralism in the discipline, economists left the 
advocacy and the success of neoclassical economics methodological approach 
instilled a belief in the ideas behind them (Sent, 2006). 
At this moment there was a very important theoretical debate about the true relevance 
of econometrics. Jan Tinbergen severely criticized Schumpeter's Business Cycles 
since the book was unaware of econometrics, and the relevant variables were the 
shocks and not the mechanism (Freeman and Louçã, 2004). The doubts of John 
Maynard Keynes regarding a blind utilization of econometrics are well-known and 
remain very relevant thirty years after Hendry (1980) stressed the role of Keynes 
ideas as a compulsory reading for all that apply statistical methods to the economic 
phenomena. Skidelsky (2009) synthesises the criticism of Keynes regarding 
econometrics in four central arguments. The first, regards estimated parameters that 
are not constant overtime or between groups. It is not reasonable to assume that these 
relations are stable and a regression is accurate if varying time or observations. 
Secondly, the process to estimate the best model is biased by the choice of the 
observations, creating a dangerous control to select the observations that are in 
accordance with a priori thoughts. In third, there are some economic dimensions are 
not possible to quantify and that are not reducible to a format that econometrics can 
manage, transforming the utilization of proxies and approximations inadequate and 
creating worthless results. Finally, a fourth limit of econometrics to Keynes was the 
parsimony and simplicity of the models. Even if econometrical analyses are useful to 
detect patterns in complex relations, the utility in uncertain and multidimensional 
processes. Keynes in 1939 criticized the excesses of Tinbergen, introducing the 
metaphor of econometrics as alchemy [as referred by Swann (2006)]. From Keynes 
letters it is noted that he had a high esteem by Tinbergen (Hendry, 1980; Louçã and 
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Castro Caldas, 2009) but this didn‟t prevent him in thinking that econometrics was a 
dangerous tool, almost a kind of black magic. John Maynard Keynes defended an 
economic science, where technical knowledge and intuition create a trained common 
sense capable of dealing with a moral subject, dependent on the uncertain character of 
the human behaviour and that cannot be restricted to the utilization of a tool like 
econometrics that needs accurate quantification and estimation to be valid. The 
comparison of econometrics with alchemy for Keynes was justified by three different 
ideas: i) the fact that econometrics tries to make a real transmutation of economic data 
(base metals) in parameters (pure gold), ii) the idea of econometrics as an elixir that 
apparently brings honour, respect and a long (academic) life to its users, and iii) the 
fact that econometrics is taken as an alkahest, a universal solvent that allows dilute 
everything. This comparison was recovered in the (now classical) article of Hendry 
(1980) that defends that even if econometrical practices have limits it should be seen 
as a scientific method. The tool is not flawless and some user bad practices subsist but 
there is no doubt that relevant knowledge about the economic realm can be produced 
if the statistical results are moderated by the existing theoretical understanding.  
After the World War II, the objective of econometrics was to create a model that 
allowed, through a set of structural equations, to replace the market in their 
allocations. To affirm this new economic approach was necessary to use a shared 
framework. The neoclassical paradigm was available and allowed both the formal 
rigor and the ability to calculate the policies even if it was based on the notions of 
equilibrium and atomized agents. In parallel, the assumptions of this school of thought 
there was a shift of the centre of econometric research from Europe to the United 
States, linking econometrics objectives to the centrality of market institutions 
(Freeman and Louçã, 2004). In the post-war period, American society was moving 
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from an aspiration of Public economic intervention towards the support for free 
market and open competition institutions, corroborating neoclassical ideas. During the 
Cold War period, the technical turn in economic science was intensified as a result of 
a shrinking in the range of beliefs, an additional narrowing of acceptable ways of 
expressing them (Sent, 2006). The developments on the micro-foundations of 
macroeconomics were crucial in the growing degree of abstraction in economical 
thought. Morgan and Rutherford (1998) underlined that the decline of pluralism took 
place within structures of patrons and hierarchies operating within the context of a 
political and economic society that supported economic intervention in the interwar 
period and free market operation in the post-war. There was an absorption by the 
dominant paradigm of neoclassical economics of econometric tools. Thus, from the 
years 50-60, with neoclassical synthesis, the matching of microeconomics with 
macroeconomics, the advent of IS-LM, the Phillips Curve and evaluation of policies 
based on models, econometric methods did prosper. In the late sixties, Ragnar Frisch, 
the father of econometrics, was begging to become a sceptical critic of the manner of 
how econometrics was used. The discussions surrounding the rise and fall of 
monetarism, whose central figure Friedman advocated maintaining the stability of a 
capitalist economy through monetary instruments for controlling the volume of 
money available, the Lucas critique with the idea that agents anticipate the measures 
economic policy and make decisions that neutralize its purpose led to a revival and a 
return to general equilibrium models creating the adequate conditions to structure 
economics, in terms of research but also in teaching, as an abstract discipline. Though 
there are several variants of modern macroeconomics, they all have their roots in 
Fisherian-Walrasian models of the process of accumulation in modern societies 
(Harcourt, 2010). The basic vision and construct in theoretical terms of Irving Fisher 
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was shown most fully and rigorously in the general equilibrium model of Arrow-
Debreu. Harcourt underlines that in the hands of Lucas and others, the model was 
simplified in order to analyse macroeconomic economies and transformed in the basis 
of stochastic general equilibrium models which at a practical level came to serve 
policy makers and central banks. Economics lost the touch with reality and 
complexity, networks, human relations and became territorially and temporally de-
contextualized. New developments have remained outside the core of the discipline, 
namely the introduction of dynamics and evolutionary theories, or territorial 
specificities have been widely developed by frontier economists far from the 
discipline orthodoxy. 
Several critical positions in this posture of economics as a science are known. It is 
worth remembering, for example, the acceptance speech of the Nobel distinction 
Trygve Haavelmo (1997: 15) where this eminent econometrician of the second half of 
the twentieth century noted that economic theories were not good enough especially 
when they start with an inadequate methodological individualism. Beginning to study 
the behaviour of individuals under certain conditions of choice where the model of 
society is created from an aggregation process appeared to be a wrong principle. 
Haavelmo supported that departing with the existing society, its set of rules and 
regulations, was more suitable to a deeper understanding the economic outcomes. 
This tension between individualism and collectivism is a major methodological gap 
between economics and other social sciences, but it seems, after much debate, 
minimized with the introduction of the concept of reconstructive downward causation 
by Hodgson (2002), consistent with other proposals, for example in the debates of 
agency-structure Lawson (2005, 2003). Individuals are influenced by their 
institutional environment and these institutions are historically and locally specific, 
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involving individuals and institutions that are not only restricted but also enhanced 
and modified by the causal powers associated with higher levels of decision. With 
reconstructive downward causation, determinism seems to be eliminated from the top 
level, by a downward causation process institutions become not only constraints but 
also inducers of change. 
 
3. The Current Use of Econometrics  
 
It may be useful to try to understand what econometrics is, in an unpretentious 
approach. It is a discipline that results from the incorporation of knowledge from 
various fields of economics, statistics and mathematics. Econometrics literally means 
"measure the economy".  It is used in various fields of applied economics to test 
economic theories, to inform policy makers and to predict future behaviours. 
Econometric models can be supported by economic theory but sometimes formal 
option is to insert multiple variables and look to frame what are more relevant 
relations in the problem under analysis. Currently the use of econometric tools 
transcends the study of economics being widely applied in several scientific areas. 
The purpose of econometric models is the estimation of relation parameters between 
dependent and independent variables articulating empirical data, not experimental or 
observable, testing hypotheses about these parameters, values and signals, the validity 
of economic theories, possible effects on public policies and forecasting. 
Econometrics seeks to help establish regularities in the economic. The vision of 
establishing general laws should be completely rejected as a goal of econometrics, as 
this purpose seems inappropriate given the nature of economic laws in which „natural‟ 
justifications in the social sciences can not resist the agency human. The econometric 
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analysis helps to identify relevant variables in a given case, the commensurability 
effects and the multipliers, trying to predict behaviour and trends. 
The nature of the data largely determines the type of analysis that can be made. A data 
set containing observations of multiple phenomena observed in a single moment of 
time is called cross sectional. In cross sectional data, the data values are important but 
not it‟s ordering. If the data set contains repeatedly observations of a single observed 
object it is called a time series. In time-series data, both the values and their 
ordination do matter. A data set containing multiple observations of the phenomena 
over time is called panel data. While the time series and cross sectional are one-
dimensional, the panel data is two-dimensional. The panel data, sometimes called 
longitudinal data or cross sectional time series are data sets with multiple cases of 
individuals, companies, countries, etc observed in two or more periods. There are two 
types of information that panel data regression techniques are appropriate to examine: 
i) differences between the various individuals, and ii) changes in behaviour over time.  
Currently different estimators also permit to obtain adequate models with more 
complex characteristics of the dependent variable, in terms of its distribution, non-
normality and over-dispersion, excessive number of zeros or even limited dependent 
variables. Techniques have evolved in such an away that can overcome the limitations 
generated by failing the classical assumptions regarding the error term
1
 or the 
impossibility to deal with non-stationarity though cointegration (Engle and Granger, 
1981). Trying to answer a question from the economic reality with an econometric 
model could have the following general steps: 
(1) Formulation of the problem (the initial questions, what we want to know). 
                                                 
1
 A error term with white noise characteristics [ut N(0, σ 2)]. Specifically the conditions of zero mean 
average for the expected value of residuals [E(ut) = 0], a common variance [Var(ut) = σ2 < ], the 
existence of no relation between different residuals [Cov (ui,uj) = 0] that are in the origin of, among 
others, the well-known problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Page 13 of 31
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
12 
(2) Collection of information (primary or secondary sources) and data transformation 
(e.g., aggregation, differentiation) and problems (missing data). 
(3) Choose the econometric model (cross-section, time-series, panel data). 
(4) Empirical analysis (parameter estimation), diagnosis (overall quality of the model, 
coefficient of determination (R-squared), model specification, linear relationships 
between variables, normality of residuals; autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, 
stationarity, analysis of the multipliers, etc). 
(5) Modifications to the model (based on tests carried out to propose changes in order 
to consolidate the model) 
(6) Answer the initial question based on their interpretation of the model. 
 
This process is today plagued by two colossal problems. The first is the disinterest of 
many econometricians and applied economists in the six stages. In fact, attention is 
highly focused on points four and five. The econometric analyses do not have often 
payed attention to what is being discussed nor respond to questions after the 
modelling is completed. It is assumed that the model is self-explicative. The second is 
that commonly the modelling of a process is carried out from specific- to-general, i.e. 
a theory-first approach, in which the researcher builds a model with few parameters, 
and apply it a battery of diagnostic tests. According to the results of these tests he 
decides to add new variables, stopping when he has a model that considers 
appropriate. This approach to modelling is widely criticized because the researchers 
eventually show only those models that look acceptable from their initial standpoint in 
theoretical and statistical terms, leaving out intermediate results. Thus a set of data 
can be manipulated repeatedly until a model is estimated based on the a priori 
thoughts of the researcher. Different people with the same data can end up with 
completely different models. Start with a theory and to insist that reality should 
behave in this way is possible but wrong. The researcher can torture the data to the 
limit. In the end the data always confess what the researcher wants to hear. 
The construction of an econometric model should be based on modelling from 
general-to-specific or a reality-first approach. The selection of the data must be based 
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on broad economic relations without the restriction of a pre-specified direction. This 
approach advocates using strict principles of econometric and statistical criteria for 
selecting a good model. It is thus facilitated the discovery of new relationships and 
validation of theories previously proposed. 
Today this general-to-specific approach (GTS) assumes some ascendant over specific-
to-general modelling even if important debates are being developed about the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach (Hendry and Mizon, 2010; Lütkepohl, 
2007). Pagan (1987) refers that the GTS owes a lot to the influential Sargan‟s paper 
about wages and prices in the UK (1964) and reflects oral tradition developed in the 
London School of Economics (LSE).  Modelling from general-to-specific is based on 
the estimation of an over-parameterized model encompassing the data generating 
process and which allows to, step-by-step, eliminate irrelevant variables. The 
subjectivity of the analysis is smaller and the results are created without a priori 
understanding or the influences of the researcher about what the final form that the 
model will take. This method has two key assumptions, simplification, i.e., to remove 
not significant variables designing a parsimonious model, and evaluation, the final 
model should be subjected to a battery of tests to confirm the correct specification and 
suitability. Cook (2003) underlines that the notion of a data generation process, the 
actual mechanism that originates the observed values underlying a specific economic 
mechanism, provides the basis for the LSE methodology, a methodology that does not 
have a solid rival disciplinary matrix in his opinion. Colander et al. (2009) and 
Juselius (2009) ensure that such an approach remains largely adjusted to contribute to 
the explanation of complexity in the context of economic crisis. These authors 
highlighted how certain econometric models, such as the vector autoregressive 
models, are able to detect patterns behind the empirical data and become a starting 
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point for an approach that captures what happens in the real world. These models also 
permit to correct the non-stationarity in economic modelling, a common problem and 
largely ignored by researchers, as noted Juselius, which led to the creation of spurious 
regressions and introduce major doubts on the use of assumptions such as ceteris 
paribus or modelling based on assumptions of rational expectations. 
 
Table 1 around here! 
 
A trained common sense and the practice of econometrics suggest five principles in 
using this tool (Table 1) with an approach based on reality. First, data occupies a 
central place in creating the model that attempts to understand certain process. 
Second, parsimony regards the preference on a short model to a more complex one, 
according to the existence of bounded rationality. A third principle suggests that a 
model to be better than another must also be able to explain alternative models results. 
A model specification that comes against well studied relations in the economic realm 
deserves a deeper analysis. Finally, an inter-temporal and inter-analytical unit 
consistency should be evident to diminish the existence of completely contradictory 
specifications. 
 
After introducing some basic principles of econometric analysis, the next sections will 
discuss additional limitations and criticisms and concludes by providing a place for 
econometrics in economic enquiry. 
 
4. Limitations and Criticisms of Econometrics 
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Today (applied) economics is dominated by econometrics. Alternative methods have 
been overlooked since there is an established view of econometrics as stronger in 
terms of applicability, efficiency and accuracy. Swann (2006) presents four main 
reasons for considering the dominance of a single technique as a negative aspect for 
economics: 
(1) Economists do not have the monopoly of knowledge about the economy - actors 
and other scientific areas also have valid contributions, even coming from a 
vernacular economics. 
(2) Econometrics is necessary but not sufficient to understand the economic - there 
are phenomena that by their nature, for example, when the type of information is 
not quantitative, that can not be analyzed by this instrument. 
(3) The excessive specialization does not promote dialogue and may not be useful in 
terms of scientific advance - the border areas are usually more likely to change 
and cross-fertilize when compared with the core of a particular discipline. 
(4) Econometrics is not appropriate for all research activities - it is necessary to have 
several types of tools for different tasks. 
 
Economics, to be applied, must be applied in the way that is based on real data and in 
that is used by others. This last issue introduces the centrality of data. Econometric 
estimates are often based on data collected from diverse sources, and in most cases, 
by non-economists with different mindsets. If the economic analysis is illuminated by 
real data it will then be useful to more people and more people will be encouraged to 
gather data that may be relevant in economic terms and thus more and better analysis 
can be done - it's a virtuous circle often broken. Swann (2006) summarizes the various 
criticisms that have been directed to econometrics. Preliminarily is crucial to 
underline that economics is not a natural science - it can not study its subject in the 
same way that physics, apart from the human agency. With this premise is also 
evident that econometrics remains a tool with flaws. Although these are constantly 
being overtaken by new theoretical developments, common practice ignores many of 
these limitations. The application of econometrics has a restricted domain. It is not a 
universal tool and should not be used in all kinds of problems, especially those whose 
Page 17 of 31
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
16 
analytical dimensions are difficult to express in variables that the tool can work. 
Econometrics, by emphasizing calculus and forgetting the importance of collecting 
data lost track of the scientific method. It is, at most, a non-substantive and 
methodological revolution as advocated by the early econometricians. Econometrics 
originates a trained incapacity because it is stimulating the production of certain 
competencies in the researchers and students who are technically capable but with 
little capability to understand economic reality and stunted the ability of trial and 
intuition. Econometrics favours the isolation of economics by enhancing an excessive 
division of labour that departs from the knowledge generated by „vernacular‟ 
economics and other social scientists. These methods seem to have decreasing returns 
to scale. If the cost of doing regressions is very low and using other methods is higher, 
it is normal that economists start making more and more regressions that cost less but 
also are worth little. Finally, econometric approach creates in the opinion of Swann a 
widespread restlessness, even without knowing why it creates discomfort among other 
social science specialists and non specialists. 
These criticisms can be answered but not all satisfactorily. Most econometricians can 
give robust responses to many of these questions by stating that the method that was 
used was not the most appropriate. The tool is good, the problem is that users do not 
know how to work with it. There is however evidence that the use of econometrics is 
a fertile field for deceptions and disappointments. The question is whether it is more 
than other scientific methods. Ziliak and McCloskey (2004) analyzed two decades of 
publications in the American Economic Review and point out that substantial part of 
the econometric studies published did not meet the fundamental assumptions of 
econometric method, did not discuss the results and did not distinguish statistical 
significance from economic significance. The arguments of Ziliak and McCloskey 
Page 18 of 31
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
17 
have been debated. An example is Engsted (2009) that stresses that these authors 
overlook important areas in economics where researchers distinguish statistical and 
economic significance. Engsted argues that conventional statistical testing can be used 
as an effective tool to obtain well specified and parsimonious models in statistical 
terms to obtain valuable knowledge about economic phenomena. Even the critics of 
Ziliak and McCloskey like Engsted accepted that statistical (in)significance does not 
imply economic (in)significance and that good empirical research in economics need 
always to discuss both types of significance. Engsted underlines that real scientific 
progress in economics, knowledge about how economies work, is mainly achieved 
through common sense, elegant theories, historical perspective and disciplined 
conversations among scholars where statistical hypotheses testing is only one among 
several important tools.  
 
5. The Need of Methodological Pluralism for Econometrics  
To put econometrics in its place we must accept that econometrics has a place where 
it belongs within economic science. However, criticisms of econometrics are 
consistent because its defenders too often behave as if econometric techniques were 
universal when in fact they are not. If we accept more qualitative methods also 
coming from other sciences, such as case studies, and informal knowledge of 
vernacular economics, common sense, intuition, insight or metaphor, we can largely 
eliminate the restrictions and the distance of econometrics to reality. If 
complementary methods are used to fill the gaps left by econometric techniques, these 
limitations are unlikely to be very relevant. Swann (2006) makes an interesting 
metaphor, econometrics as triangulation, measuring the locations of objects very far 
with the minimal displacement, the principles of trigonometry introduced by Frisius in 
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1533. The triangulation method was much applauded at the time but its limitations are 
evident today. It requires great precision in measurements, particularly when the base 
of the triangle, the starting point is far from the object. This suggests another 
triangulation, the triangulation defended by the author, the need to use various tools, 
methods and theories to find more robust results or paradoxes. Downward and 
Mearman (2005) stress that triangulation offers a potential solution to the impasse 
between a formalist approach and the approach of those who are critical to the 
mainstream „traditional‟ methods. For these authors the simplest form of triangulation 
is the employment of judgement by the economist about their models, tools, theories 
or data. They refer “(…) an economist might use an econometric model (which often 
they have created) to produce an estimation. They could in principle, passively 
receive the information from the model, simply report this result and stop their 
investigation. However, they can be more active, and apply their judgement to the 
result, perhaps to interpret it in a specific way. This employment of judgement can be 
interpreted as the interaction of economist with model, and thus is a form of 
triangulation.” Several types of triangulation can also be referred: i) data 
triangulation, involving time, space and people; ii) the triangulation of researchers, 
which is the use of several researchers, and not a single observer; iii) theoretical 
triangulation, which consists of use more than one theoretical scheme in the 
interpretation of the phenomenon, and finally; iv) methodological triangulation, which 
involves more than one method. Methodological triangulation offers a stronger 
answer for complex questions. In practical terms it means that some methods are more 
robust than others dealing with a specific topic or dimension of the topic that is not 
covered by the implementation of a single technique.  
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Sheila Dow (2007) advocates the theoretical and methodological plurality, 
introducing a cynical view about the economics when too focused on the 
mathematical formalism, and avoidance of ideology. Dow shows evidence of growing 
pluralism in economics. The notions of rationality and uncertainty become more 
complex which would suggest the economy as an open system in which it is 
impossible to base models of absolute causal mechanisms because it considers human 
action with all the unpredictability that underlies in it. New methodologies should 
reflect how the construction of reality is made by the researcher. For this author, 
current economics has remained often linked to an excessive technocratic character, 
where a monistic approach meant that economists do not need to justify used 
methods. There is no need of methodological justifications in times of orthodoxy. 
Mathematical formalism has often been the mark of identity of what is economics. 
Sheila Dow suggests that analyzing economics in the lens of concepts introduced by 
the social studies of science may be relevant to include reflexivity in economic 
science. The pluralism that is emerging allows the emergence of a diversity of ideas 
that consolidate the own scientific building of economics. Analogous to the genetic 
diversity that strengthens a living organism from outside threats, the theoretical and 
methodological variety allows economics to respond more successfully to challenges 
and to understand the economic phenomena more satisfactorily. Although Sheila Dow 
defends pluralism, she does not believe that anything goes and suggests caution. The 
cross-fertilization is a positive aspect to toughen a science but it requires even greater 
attention to inaccuracy which may arise in this context with different meanings. 
Victoria Chick (1998) presents two very important arguments in favour of the 
plurality of methods. The first is that the existing formalism is too confident in its 
methods, which are not as robust or independent of its proponents advocate. The 
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second is that formal methods are not accurate. The vagueness that more formal 
methods appear to remove only happens in theory, because the object, the economic, 
remains vague and complex as when any other method is used. The methods are 
largely dependent on a priori choices of the researcher. For example, the common use 
of static analysis completely eliminates the notion of evolution and change, while the 
analysis of time series end up focusing on a case study as a closed and independent 
system. The notion that there is a permanent disequilibrium, that systems are in 
constant evolution, greatly limits the success of the dominant reference framework. 
To resolve this contradiction Chick defends the openness of systems. Open systems 
have path dependencies, are non-ergodic and show no regularities or equilibriums. 
Neves (2007) proposes a complementary idea of pluralism in economics to promote 
discussion and permeability with other scientific disciplines and its surroundings. An 
open system allows the absorption of new ideas and knowledge through a series of 
semi-permeable barriers. 
Economic research must take into account two central concepts: the exploration and 
composition (Swann, 2006). Exploration refers to entering into uncharted and 
uncomfortable areas but that allow the deeper understanding of economies. This 
exploration should happen using a comprehensive set of tools and approaches that can 
respond to a diversity of dimensions and objects, the composition. This multiplicity of 
approaches ensures thinking on several levels, the genesis of creative thought and 
theoretical and methodological advances. Where econometrics fails the applied 
economist should have alternative means to achieve useful results and satisfactory 
explanations of reality, even if initially result in paradoxes. The plurality is especially 
interesting when techniques are very different, compensating in strengths and 
weaknesses, for example, econometrics is strong where the case studies fail and vice 
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versa. Prigogine and Stengers (1984) [quoted by Chick (1998)] show how these 
problems of a narrow view of objectivity have been taken into account in the hard 
sciences that served as inspiration to economics: “Both at the macroscopic and 
microscopic levels, the natural sciences have […] rid themselves of a conception of 
objective reality that implied that novelty and diversity had to be denied in the name 
of immutable universal laws. They have rid themselves of a fascination with a 
rationality taken as closed and a knowledge seen as nearly achieved. They are now 
open to the unexpected, which they no longer define as the result of imperfect 
knowledge or insufficient control.”  
For some authors (e.g., Landreth and Colander, 2004) the evolution of economics is a 
swinging pendulum between formalist and non-formalist approaches. The fact that 
today formalism still has a prevalent word is not a problem in itself. These authors 
support that currently formalism is essentially methodological and the profession 
seems to be moving towards a more intuitive paradigm. A very wide range of 
heterodoxies has gained increased relevance in economic theory (Davis, 2006). If we 
think that a science depends on education and research we understand that, despite the 
instruction remains highly connected to the orthodoxy, research is increasingly 
characterized by a high degree of theoretical and methodological pluralism. 
Successful research programs will be synthesized and incorporated into the education, 
which first occurs in advanced programs, such as doctoral programs, which force the 
extension of research frontier. Davis illustrates his idea of expansion and contraction 
of orthodoxy to the intrinsic capacity to enhance its explanatory component in the 
mainstream, which is reflected in the ability to export theoretical and methodological 
approaches to other scientific areas, or conversely, increasing pluralism in mainstream 
importing content from other sciences. This view of the consolidation of a theoretical 
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body of orthodoxy as a trade balance can be illustrated by the times known as the 
imperialism of economics where, for example, Gary Becker led the rational choice 
theory to issues such as crime or marriage, or moreover, the current situation of 
extended pluralism that Davis defines as reversed imperialism. In moments of 
expansion of the dominant paradigm, normal science, economists do not feel the need 
to understand the evolutionary history of the discipline and to justify their 
methodological choices. At present there remains a clear separation between 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and Davis says that is happening a selective appropriation 
of heterodox content by the mainstream. In this way the mainstream of economics is 
becoming less the orthodoxy of economics, an increasingly broad group of heterodox 
thinkers see themselves as members of the mainstream and are recognized by the elite 
of the mainstream as an integral part of this group. Theoretical pluralism, rooted in 
various heterodox approaches, research and advanced training, may induce the 
emerging of new methodological approaches. But defending now the death of the 
Neoclassical school (Colander, 2000) and the fall of the orthodoxy can be excessive 
when the teaching is still dominated by the ideas of rational choice and economists are 
still in a very high proportion, using these conceptual and methodological frameworks 
in they everyday life. 
All collectives of thought have ways of expressing themselves, to socialize, integrate 
members and create scientific facts (Fleck, 1979). Econometrics is one way of sharing 
among economists that continues to consolidate but will have in the future a more 
modest role, although indispensable, in economics. The excessive codification can be 
sterile and a way to hide the results from the possibility of a more general discussion 
to find flaws in the scientific building. Latour (1987) shows how this is a common 
defensive strategy in the production of science today. The core of a discipline in a 
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scientific field like economics is characterized by a large population that encourages 
excessive use of jargon, intense debate over irrelevant topics and a safe and routine 
work carried out by a broad intellectual community that tries to protect its status quo 
costly obtained with their intellectual training. 
 
5. Final Remarks: A Place for Econometrics in Economics 
The distinction between a positive and pure economics and other, with a normative 
dimension is an inappropriate fiction. The field of economics, the economic, is impure 
(Reis, 2007). Businesses, individuals, countries, institutions, and finally what is the 
material, the texture of the object of economic science, are normative a priori. 
Economists are unable to purge the normative content of economy and took it as a 
positive science. Ideology will be always relevant in the study of the economy. 
Objectivity remains, for many economists, dependent on basic aspects of orthodox 
economics, as the mathematical formalism or marginalist analysis. But objectivity is 
dependent upon the relation of subject and object and not a particular method. The 
specific method that is used is just one of issues to consider for the economic 
understanding. The objectivity of economics is not called into question by its 
normative character. It is not possible to take from the enterprises, the individuals, nor 
the countries or institutions the values which determine their actions and shape the 
individual behaviour that is reflected in economic performance. The traditional view 
of objectivity, imported from the natural sciences to social sciences (Prpic, 2009) is 
largely inadequate to the central assumptions of economics like human agency or non-
ergodicity. It is necessary to consolidate a useful notion of objectivity to economics. 
Work to be done. 
Page 25 of 31
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
24 
It is worth remembering how two of the greatest economists, Alfred Marshall and 
John Maynard Keynes, took part in this debate. Despite the fact that quantitative 
methods in the time of these thinkers do not had the same degree of sophistication of 
current methods, they departed from analogous assumptions. The methodological 
agendas of Marshall and Keynes to analyze complex economic systems allowed 
Marchionatti (2002) to systematize some common features. Quantitative methods 
were seen as important tools, not only useful but needed, for both economists, but that 
required careful analysis to generalizations, since the economic domain was distinct 
from other sciences. The mathematization was only useful when the approach was 
consistent with the properties of the system to be analyzed. The search for general 
results for all situations was a utopia, a quasi-formal style was considered often more 
appropriate to connect ideas, a mixture of intuition, value judgments and analytical 
skills, a trained common sense, were indicated as requirements to deal with the 
interpretation of the complexity of the economy. 
The main tool of today economics, econometrics, should serve firstly and foremost to 
understand the economic to good life where human happiness can be reached. The 
choice of method depends on its suitability to the object under review. The 
econometric forecasts are often the most robust and accurate estimates, but must be 
understood as a vague picture of the process and not a high resolution image of it. An 
example, is forecasting, one of the most criticized elements by the opponents of 
econometrics, if well done, is very important in economic analysis. In the short term, 
econometric forecasts are usually accurate. This is particularly useful to help agents 
like firms in their planning. The great difficulty is to realize the cyclical turning 
moments. In the long run, the problems regarding forecasting are different in nature, 
one can predict that something will happen, for example, the systematic accumulation 
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of external deficits without investment in improved competitiveness will provoke a 
crisis, but the difficulty is knowing when it will happen. Anyway, these long-term 
forecasts help us to prepare for the risks of the future (Cardoso, 2008). 
There is at present more theoretical than methodological heterogeneity. Economic 
science is faced with a series of new challenges that may constrain the evolution of 
the discipline. Institutionalist and evolutionist schools have shown the limitations of 
orthodoxy of economics. The financial market crisis has also left, for all to see, that 
the markets do not always work, and how the institutions created by the Washington 
Consensus, consolidated and underpinned by ideas of the Chicago School, failed to 
promote a fair globalization. It is worth taking in this context attention to 
methodological choices that serve the economists. Formal methods like econometrics 
have their place in a satisfactory economics. We must find this place. The working 
table of the applied economist should be prepared to benefit from all the 
complementarities of the various methods. A place, among many other methods, such 
as multivariate analysis, the case studies or even other qualitative analysis, that 
economists have to find. The complexity of the economic demands increasing 
theoretical pluralism that requires methodological pluralism. Triangulation of 
methodologies are essential to reduce the limits of a single technique. Even Krugman 
(1998: 1836) in an article that intended to be a defence of the formalism in economic 
science, showed that it is important to leave room for other approaches in economics: 
“In short, two cheers for formalism – but reserve the third for sophisticated 
informality.”  
Econometrics can be used as a preliminary approach to underline broad trends and 
patterns. It can be used to define factors that are central to certain relations and test 
suggestions from the results of case studies and other multivariate statistical methods. 
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Macro-econometrics is crucial to underline long-run relations and providing 
predictions in the case of less volatile contexts. Micro-econometrics is central to 
comprehend the behaviour of actors, controlling clustering effects, by giving insights 
on the relevance hierarchy of certain variables for a certain phenomena.  
Like any tool, econometrics will only be effective if well applied. Econometric 
models should always pay attention to data collection, estimation procedures and 
verification of statistical quality. General-to-specific modelling reduces the problems 
of subjectivity in the definition of the models. The subjectivity, one of the central 
limitations from the point of view of formalist approaches to other methods, is 
obviously present when a specific to general modelling approach is preferred.  
But econometrics is not only statistics. It is also economics so the theoretical 
understanding and interpretation of a model is essential to learn about the economic 
significance of the models. That is why I agree with the vision of Peter Swann (2006), 
where “econometric estimates should be taken with a pinch of salt”, with the 
awareness that in several domains econometrics is of very limited use. Econometrics 
is surely no universal solvent but will always have a place in applied economics. A 
more modest role than now, when it is assumed in many schools that a thesis without 
advanced econometrics is not a thesis in economics. 
Plurality in methods is essential for innovative economics, this idea of Swann 
(ibidem: 71) for a science that guarantees economic dialogue with adjacent fields of 
economics and cross-fertilization. Innovative economics is convergent with the notion 
of a satisfactory economics that should be able to create such a diverse new 
framework in economic science (Pinto, 2008). 
To conclude, I am very far from extreme positions, for example of Tony Lawson 
(2009), that underlines that econometrics and other statistical methods are irrelevant 
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and that economists should eliminate them from their daily research and work 
practices. As Juselius (2009: 11) claims even John Maynard Keynes would appreciate 
a well applied econometrics: “As Keynes was a scholar with a deep respect for the 
complexity of economic life, he would probably have been convinced that econometric 
models, when adequately used, are indispensable as tools for improving our grasp of 
the complicated economic life.” Econometrics is not only a tool to measure economic 
relations and variables. Used wisely it is an instrument that facilitates greater depth 
understanding of the economy and, in this way, to engage with more power the goal 
of economic science, the promotion of good life. 
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Appendix  
Table 1. Principles and Corollaries in Econometric Modelling 
Principle Corollary 
 
Consistency of data 
Is the data that determines the structure of the 
models  
Parsimony 
Simple specifications are preferable to 
complex 
Encompassing 
The model is able to explain the results of 
other rival models  
 
Consistent with economic theory 
Models to reverse previously studied 
regularities deserve a careful second look  
Consistency of the parameters 
The parameters should remain adequate over 
time and between individuals 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
